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Private slate mailers in California have become part of the biennial
political process. For-profit businesses sell their "endorsements" to can-
didates and proponents of ballot measures and mail recommended slates
to targeted voters. These mailers have become big business in California1
and a political necessity for many candidates.' Many, however, are pur-
posely deceptive. Mailers appearing to report official party recommenda-
tions sometimes endorse and carry campaign messages from members of
the opposite party who have paid to be included.' Candidates purchase
spots on slates to exclude the opposition from them.4 Party luminaries
who have not sought inclusion are sometimes linked with ballot measures
they have opposed.5
California's Political Reform Act of 1974 (Title 9), as amended,6
requires that slate mailer organizations7 register with the Secretary of
State8 and comply with extensive disclosure requirements.9 The Act also
mandates that slate mailer organizations state on the mailings themselves
that the mailings are not official party documents, that some candidates
and ballot measure proponents have paid to be endorsed, and that ap-
pearance in the mailer does not imply endorsement of other candidates
listed in the mailer.' 0 The Fair Political Practices Commission enforces
Title 9 provisions through cease and desist orders and imposition of pen-
alties of up to $2,000 per violation."1
Despite the requirements of the Act, California's slate mailers re-
main deceptive. Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the oper-
ation of the slate mailer business in California and current regulations
1. See Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, Selling Endorsements to Top Bidders, 22
NAT'L J. 1498 (1990); see also infra part I.A.
2. See Dean Murphy & Paul Feldman, Cries of Foul Fill Political Air as Slate Mailers
Arrive, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1990, at Al; see also Mark Simon, Slate Mailers: Selling Endorse-
ments for Fun and Profit, 20 CAL. J. 289, 290 (1989); see also infra parts I.B. and III.
3. See Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 294 (9th. Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J., concurring),
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 231 (1991).
4. See Murphy & Feldman, supra note 2, at Al; see also infra part III.
5. See, e.g., Prop. 51, UPI, June 2, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File;
Coalition '88 Issues Report Card on Campaign Slate Mailers, PR Newswire, Nov. 7, 1988,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Murphy & Feldman, supra note 2; see also infra
part III.
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 81000 - 91015 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992). The original Polit-
ical Reform Act was an initiative measure approved by the voters in June, 1974.
7. Defined as businesses that collect $500 or more and either support or oppose four or
more candidates or ballot measures. Id. §§ 82048.3, 82048.4(a)(1)-(2).
8. Id. § 84106.5(a), (c).
9. Id. §§ 82048.4, 84106.5, 84108, 84219.
10. Id. § 84305.5(a)(2).
11. Id. § 83116.
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which monitor the practice. Part II discusses the constitutional implica-
tions of regulating both political and commercial speech. Part III argues
that slate mailer regulation is needed and constitutionally permissible.
Part IV concludes that with minor modifications, California's regulations
could become a model for other states by striking an appropriate balance
between freedom of expression and accurate voter information.
I
Slate Mailers
Slate mailers appear to be a uniquely California phenomenon.12 The
size of the state, the expense of running campaigns in large districts with
mobile populations, and the relative weakness of the political parties may
help account for this fact. Nevertheless, because the practice is a lucra-
tive one for the slate mailer organizations, it is reasonable to assume that
slate mailers will spread to other states. Those states can thus learn from
California's experience.
A. The Slate Mailer Business
Slate mailers have been a part of the political landscape in California
for the last decade.' 3 Sixty-seven for-profit slate mailer businesses regis-
tered with the state in 1992. " These businesses sell their endorsements
to candidates and proponents of ballot measures. The price of endorse-
ments varies according to the office sought, how well the endorsed candi-
date or issue is featured, and the reputation and direct-mail operation of
the slate mailer organization.' 5
12. Jack Germond and Jules Witcover describe slate mailers as a "California invention"
and mention no other states where the mailers are used. Id. See also Alan C. Miller, Mr.
Inside & Mr. Outside: The Audacious Berman Brothers Built a Powerful Progressive Machine
in California. But Can They Survive a New Political Order?, L.A. TIMEs, March 29, 1992,
(Magazine), at 18. California Common Cause Legislative Advocate Ruth Holden, whose or-
ganization has sponsored legislation to regulate slate mailers, was unaware of the practice in
any other state. As of July, 1992, LEXIS and Westlaw contained no statutory references to
slate mailers in any state other than California. Representatives of other organizations familiar
with election practices nationwide, such as the Elections Center and the National Center for
Policy Alternatives, were likewise unfamiliar with the practice outside California.
13. See Kenneth Reich, Slate Mailers-Real Story Often Appears in Fine Print, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1988, § 1, at 3. Some mailers have been around even longer. For example,
"The Community Democrat" was founded in 1962. See Michele Fuetsch, Dymally in Legal
Battle Over Mailer, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1990, at J1.
14. Dean Murphy, California Elections '92: Candidates Say They Can't Afford to Ignore
Costly Slate Mailers, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 1992, at A20. Twenty-five organizations were regis-
tered in 1988. See Simon, supra note 2, at 290.
15. Germond & Witcover, supra note 1.
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California's leading slate mailer organization is the Beverly Hills
firm of Michael Berman and Carl D'Agostino (B.A.D.)."6 Berman and
D'Agostino's "'88 Voter Guide" collected more than $3.3 million from
candidates and proponents of ballot measures for inclusion on B.A.D.
slate mailers. 7 In 1990, B.A.D.'s voter guide collected more than $3.6
million.18 B.A.D. and other slate mailer organizations tailor slates to
specific voters. In 1990, B.A.D. mailed eight million slate cards and fol-
low-up "mailograms" in the primary and nine million in the general elec-
tion.1 9 B.A.D. targets mailings by legislative district, city, and county,2"
and by voter inclination.2 There were 18,000 variations in 1988, accord-
ing to D'Agostino.22
While many politicians privately wish commercial slate mailers
could be abolished,23 the mailers have become a political necessity for
many candidates and proponents of issues. Parties sometimes mail rec-
ommended slates, but these are sporadic and generally less well distrib-
uted than those disseminated by the for-profit businesses.24 Slate mailers
are also less expensive than direct mail.25 Because they are among the
least expensive ways to bring a candidate to the attention of voters, the
mailers are particularly valuable to those who are not well known by the
16. Germond & Witcover, supra note 1; Simon, supra note 2, at 290.
17. Simon, supra note 2, at 290. In the general election, the California Trial Lawyers
Association paid $1.3 million for a "Yes on 100" (insurance initiative) endorsement; Leo Mc-
Carthy's Senate campaign paid $300,000 for an endorsement; and the "Yes on Proposition 98"
(school funding) campaign paid $200,000. Id.
18. Murphy & Feldman, supra note 2. Diane Feinstein paid approximately $500,000 to
head B.A.D.'s "Democratic Voter Guide" for the 1990 primary. Germond & Witcover, supra
note 1. Then-state senator John Garamendi paid B.A.D. $350,000 to be endorsed as state
insurance commissioner, and opponents of the reapportionment initiatives paid B.A.D.
$210,000 for a "No on Propositions 118 and 119" recommendation. Id.
19. Miller, supra note 12.
20. Simon, supra note 2.
21. Miller, supra note 12. For example, B.A.D. makes assumptions based on whether a
woman uses "Mrs. or Ms." and whether a resident owns or rents. Id.
22. Id.
23. Telephone Interview with Margaret Herman, former Legislative Advocate, League of
Women Voters of California (Oct. 12, 1991); Telephone Interview with Ruth Holden, Legisla-
tive Advocate, California Common Cause (Oct. 29, 1991).
24. See Germond & Witcover, supra note 1. The authors observe that the official party
slate that endorsed then-Attorney General Van de Kamp for governor in the 1990 Democratic
primary, for example, "didn't carry the weight" of the B.A.D. slate that endorsed Feinstein.
Id.
25. Murphy & Feldman, supra note 2.
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electorate, such as judicial aspirants.26 Voters, particularly the unde-
cided, consider them important sources of information about elections.27
Greater voter awareness of a candidate's name does not necessarily
lead to greater understanding of what that candidate represents, how-
ever. Slate mailer organizations sometimes endorse candidates less for
their views than for their pocketbooks.2" Some slate mailer organizations
actually "shop around" their endorsements to the highest bidder.29
The chief problem with slate mailers is that they are frequently de-
ceptive. Slate mailers have misled voters by masquerading as official
party endorsements when they are not, by misrepresenting public offi-
cials' positions on the issues, and by implying that candidates at the top
of the ticket endorse others named on the slates.30 The California legisla-
ture has responded by regulating the industry to some extent.3a
B. Current Regulations
Legislation regulating slate mailers has been incorporated into Cali-
fornia's Political Reform Act of 1974 (Title 9) since 1988.32 The Act
defines slate mailers as mass mailings consisting of over 200 substantially
similar pieces of unsolicited mail that support or oppose four or more
candidates or ballot measures.33 Slate mailer organizations are entities
that collect $500 or more to mail them.34
Slate mailer organizations must register with the Secretary of State
and comply with extensive disclosure requirements. Each must report
the organization's name, address, and telephone number; the name, ad-
dress, and telephone number of its treasurer and other principal of-
ficers;31 and the name of any individual, entity, or other person who
26. See Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 294 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J., concurring),
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991).
27. Voters surveyed in 1990 by the Charlton Research Co., a Republican polling and
strategy firm, ranked slate mailers ahead of television and radio spots, televised debates, news-
paper endorsements, and state political party recommendations as a source of information
about elections. Murphy, supra note 14.
28. See infra part III. This is not to say that slate mailers do not generally favor either
predominantly Democratic candidates and causes or predominantly Republican ones. Carl
D'Agostino, for example, claims that B.A.D.'s "Democratic Voter Guide" is "reflective of
Democratic philosophies." Simon, supra note 2, at 291.
29. Germond & Witcover, supra note 1.
30. See infra part III.
31. See Simon, supra note 2; Amy Pyle, Republicans File Complaint Against Firm That
Mailed Misleading Flyers, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1989, § 2, at 8.
32. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 82048.4, 84106.5, 84108, 84219 (West Supp. 1992).
33. Id. §§ 82048.3, 82041.5.
34. Id. § 82048.4.
35. Id. § 84108.
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controls the organization.36 An organization must also reveal totals re-
ceived and disbursed on behalf of every candidate or ballot measure dur-
ing each campaign period." While the information may seem somewhat
inaccessible to even the curious individual, it is frequently obtained and
reported by the media.
Since 1988, the Act has required official slate mailer organizations to
include the following Notice to Voters in eight-point type at the top or
bottom of their mailers:
38
NOTICE TO VOTERS: THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED BY
-, NOT AN OFFICIAL POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZA-
TION. Appearance in this mailer does not necessarily imply endorse-
ment of others in this mailer. Appearance is paid for and authorized
by each candidate and ballot measure which is designated by an *39
As of January 1, 1992, mailers must also print the party designation
of any endorsed candidate whose party affiliation is different from the
one the mailer appears to represent. 4° The regulation is designed to dis-
courage slate mailers that appear to represent a particular political party
from endorsing members of other political parties.41 In addition, after
January 1, 1993, each slate mailer must include among its disclaimers in
the Notice to Voters that appearance in the mailer "does not necessarily
imply... endorsement of, or opposition to, any issues set forth in the
mailer.42
If the Fair Political Practices Commission determines on the basis of
a hearing that there has been a violation of any regulation, it must issue
an order requiring the violator to cease and desist, file any reports or
documents required, and pay a penalty of up to $2,000 for each violation
36. Id. § 84106.5.
37. Id. § 84219(a)-(b).
38. The regulation requires the notice to be placed "[a]t the top or bottom of the front side
or surface of at least one insert or at the top or bottom of one side or surface of a postcard or
other self mailer .... [The notice] shall be in a color or print which contrasts with the back-
ground so as to be easily legible, and in a printed or drawn box and set apart from any other
printed matter." Id. § 84305.5(a)(2).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 84305.5.
41. Committee Analysis, Cal. S.B. 113, 1991-92 Reg. Sess., SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ELECTIONS AND REAPPORTIONMENT, hearing Mar. 6, 1991 (Feb. 28, 1991).
42. Governor Pete Wilson signed Cal. A.B. 1640, Cal. Leg. 1991-92, Reg. Sess. (1991).
Telephone Interview with Assemblymember Jackie Speier's office (Oct. 1, 1992). The measure
will amend CAL. GOV'T CODE § 84305.5.
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to the General Fund of the state.43 "Each violation" apparently means
each violation of any provision."
C. Proposals for Reform
Additional proposals for reform have included banning slate mailers
entirely,45 requiring authorization from political parties before distribut-
ing mailers appearing to be official party endorsements, 46 and requiring
written permission from candidates for the use of their names or pictures
on slate mailers. 7 These suggestions are not likely to survive a constitu-
tional challenge.48 Instead, this Note proposes amending regulations to
increase penalties for violations, to require that notices be printed in ten-
point type rather than eight,"' and to mandate that a fourteen-point
asterisk precede the Notice to Voters. This Note will argue that, with
relatively minor changes, California's current slate mailer provisions
could be a model for other states, properly balancing the right to freedom
of expression with concerns for an informed electorate.
43. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 83116 (West Supp. 1992). This provision was strengthened, ef-
fective January 1992. If the Commission determines after a hearing that a violation has oc-
curred, it may now require the violator to cease and desist and pay a fine of up to $2,000 for
each violation. Formerly, the statute specified the Commission could require a cease and desist
order or a fine of up to $2,000.
44. See Ted Appel, Murray Accused of Campaign Violations, UPI, Aug. 5, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; Assemblyman Accused of 35 Campaign Rule Violations,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1991, at A19. State Assemblyman Willard Murray faced a maximum
$70,000 fine based on $2,000 per violation: failing to report 17 large late payments, sending
eight slate mailers which contained no "Notice to Voters," failing to file six campaign state-
ments listing contributions and expenditures, and failing to identify the committee's address on
the outside of four mailers. Id. The Fair Political Practices Commission, in fact, fined him
only $16,700. Nevertheless, Commission Chairman Ben Davidian described the fine as "one of
the largest" yet imposed. Mark Gladstone, Watchdog Agency Fines Assemblyman Over Slate
Mailers, L.A. TIMEs, June 5, 1992, at B3.
45. See Pyle, supra note 31.
46. AB 1335, Cal. Leg. 1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1989).
47. AB 1027, Cal. Leg. 1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1989). As introduced, AB 1640, Cal. Leg.
1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1991) would have avoided the difficulties of AB 1027 by requiring for-
profit slate mailer organizations that refer to a candidate, elected officer, or ballot measure,
without written authorization, to notice that fact on the mailer. The author deleted the provi-
sion in the bill's final version.
48. See infra part III.
49. AB 3422, Cal. Leg. 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1991) would have required a notice in 12-





Constitutional Issues Affecting Slate Mailer Regulation
A. Classification of Slate Mailers as Highly Protected or Less Protected
Speech
1. Political Speech
Arguably, any regulation of slate mailers interferes with constitu-
tional protections of free expression. The First Amendment of the
United States Constitution declares that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech." 50 While the amendment has never
been enforced literally,"' its protections are far-reaching. 2 California's
constitution also guarantees free speech. The provision, which is "more
definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment,"53 proclaims that
"[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may
not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."5 4
Since free political discourse is the hallmark of a free society,55 the
First Amendment is especially protective of political speech. Regulation
of political speech is suspect because of its potential for chilling legiti-
mate public dissent.56 The United States Supreme Court in Brown v.
Hartlage57 noted "there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of [the First Amendment] was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs."5" The guarantee of free speech "has its fullest and
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for polit-
ical office." 59 An intelligent evaluation of candidates presupposes they
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that certain speech is outside the protection
of the First Amendment, e.g., speech "pursued as an integral part of criminal conduct," sedi-
tious speech, "fighting words," obscene speech, etc. See WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 645 (7th ed. 1991). See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503
(1951). "[A]n analysis of the leading cases in this Court which have involved direct limitations
on speech . . .will demonstrate that both the majority of the Court and the dissenters in
particular cases have recognized that [the right to free speech] is not an unlimited, unqualified
right, but that the societal value of speech must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values
and considerations." Id.
52. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of free speech
from state action. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
53. Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116, 120 (Cal. 1975).
54. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a).
55. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1963), Justice Brennan speaks
of our "profound national commitment to the principal that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide-open ...."
56. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
57. 456 U.S. 45 (1981).
58. Id. at 52 (1981) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966)).
59. Id. at 53.
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have an "unfettered opportunity to make their views known." ° Free
political discussion is also seen as a source of truth. "[T]he freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think," Justice Brandeis has
claimed, "are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of polit-
ical truth."' 6' "[T]he best test of truth," said Justice Holmes, "is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket ....62
Despite the high protection accorded political speech, regulation is
permissible in certain circumstances. In evaluating whether a particular
regulation of political speech is constitutionally permissible, a court bal-
ances the state's legitimate interests in regulation against the desirability
of the free flow of information.63 The Court recognizes that "[s]tates
have a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of their electoral
processes."" Nevertheless, "[w]hen a State seeks directly to restrict the
offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters, the First Amendment ...
requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by a compelling
[state interest], and that the restriction operate without unnecessarily cir-
cumscribing protected expression."65 There is no litmus test for deter-
mining which state election law restrictions are valid and which are
invalid. A court must determine the legitimacy and strength of compet-
ing interests and consider the extent to which those interests make it
necessary to burden the one claiming the constitutional right.66
For example, Brown v. Hartlage67 held that a Kentucky state statute
prohibiting a candidate from offering material benefits to voters in ex-
change for their votes could not constitutionally apply to a candidate
who merely promised to lower his own salary if elected.6" Although a
state can prohibit corrupt practices, it cannot prohibit a candidate from
making such a generalized appeal to the voters.69 "It is simply not the
function of government to 'select which issues are worth discussing or
debating.' "70
The permissibility of regulating slate mailers as political speech,
therefore, hinges on: (1) whether the state's interest in an informed elec-
60. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1975).
61. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
62. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
63. See Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 52-54.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 53-54. See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
66. Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986).
67. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
68. Id. at 57.
69. Id. at 58.
70. Id. at 60 (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
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torate is compelling; (2) to what extent the regulations restrict the flow of
ideas; and (3) whether the restrictions are narrowly drawn to avoid im-
pinging on other protected speech.
2. Commercial Speech
Because slate mailer organizations pay for their mailers by charging
ballot measure supporters and some candidates for their slates' endorse-
ments, slate mailers may appear to be a form of commercial rather than
political speech. This distinction is critical because political speech is
protected to a far greater degree than commercial speech. While the
Court has "rejected the highly paternalistic view that government has
complete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech,"71 it distin-
guishes commercial from other forms of protected speech.
The Court defined commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission as "expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience" which "pro-
pos[es] a commercial transaction... in an area traditionally subject to
government regulation."72 Thus the New York Public Service Commis-
sion regulation that banned an electric utility from promoting the use of
electricity in its advertisements involved commercial, not political
speech.73
Although the First Amendment prohibits content-based regulation
in most contexts, it allows limited regulation of the content of commer-
cial speech.74  The Court has characterized commercial speech as a
"hardy breed" of expression, not overly susceptible to suppression by
regulation.75 In addition, commercial speakers presumably know their
markets and products and are thus better able to evaluate the accuracy of
their message and the lawfulness of their activity than political
speakers.7 6
The government may ban deceptive commercial speech because of
its concern for truth in the commercial arena.77 For commercial speech
71. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1979).
Commercial speech was first accorded constitutional protection in Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), where the Court invalidated a state
statute which prohibited advertising prices of prescription drugs.
72. 447 U.S. at 561-62.
73. Id. at 561.
74. Id. at 564 n.6.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 563. The implication is that there is less concern for truthful information in the
political arena (a somewhat dubious proposition) or that the opportunity for exposure of un-
truthful information is greater in the political context.
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to be protected, it must concern a lawful activity and not be misleading.7"
The government may regulate even protected commercial speech if the
asserted governmental interest is substantial, the regulation directly ad-
vances that interest, and the regulation is no more extensive than neces-
sary to serve the purported objective.79
B. Impermissible and Permissible Restraints on Speech
Nearly as critical as classifying slate mailers as either political or
commercial speech is ascertaining whether current regulations and those
proposed by this Note constitute an impermissible prior restraint, an in-
fringement on the right of free association, or justified disclosure.
1. Prior Restraints
Since violations of Title 9 can result in cease and desist orders,
8 0
regulation of slate mailers at least theoretically involves prior restraint.
One of the chief purposes of the guarantee of free speech is to prevent
prior restraints on publication; such restraints are presumed constitution-
ally invalid .8  This is especially true where the statements involve criti-
cisms of public officials.8 2 In Wilson v. Superior Court, 3 the California
Supreme Court held that a preliminary injunction on the publication and
distribution of allegedly misleading and libelous statements made by a
political candidate about his opponent, the incumbent, was a constitu-
tionally impermissible prior restraint.84 The court recognized that prior
restraints were permissible "under some extraordinary circumstances,"
such as preventing the wartime disclosure of military secrets.85 But it
observed that it had not found any case where a court had upheld re-
straining publication of statements about the official conduct of public
officers on the grounds that the statements were false or deceptive.8 6 Al-
lowing a court to determine whether drafts of a newsletter were suffi-
ciently "fair" to merit publication would put the court in the
impermissible role of censor.87
Despite the strong language in Wilson, one California court of ap-
peal in Drexel v. Mann"' upheld a California statute that permitted
78. Id. at 563-64.
79. Id. at 566.
80. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 83116(a) (West Supp. 1992).
81. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
82. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1963).
83. 532 P.2d 116 (Cal. 1975).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 122.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 120.
88. 278 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 812 P.2d 562 (Cal. 1991).
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amendment or deletion of false or misleading statements in the official
voters' pamphlet. Because the state had created the "unique vehicle of
expression" for use by certain individuals, the voters' pamphlet was a
"limited public forum."89 The state that created it thus had a compelling
interest in the accuracy of the information published in it, an interest the
court found more compelling than the candidates' interest in free speech
within that forum.90 Because a candidate injured in an official voters'
pamphlet had no way of responding to every voter receiving it, the court
concluded that no remedy for an injured candidate short of prior re-
straint would be adequate. Candidates were still free to distribute mis-
leading statements in other forums.9" The court cited with approval
Patterson v. Board of Supervisors,92 upholding similar procedures for pub-
lic examination of statements submitted to municipal and county voters'
pamphlets on ballot measures.93 Although the California Supreme Court
has granted review of Mann,94 a reversal would not affect slate mailers
because slate mailers are not limited public forums created by the state.
Because slate mailers are not limited public forums, injunctions for
violation of slate mailer regulations may be impermissible. Current regu-
lations and those proposed by this Note, however, do not impose the
same kinds of restrictions on content as those involved in Wilson. En-
joining publication because a candidate has said something is different
from enjoining publication because he has failed to say something.
2. Restraints on Freedom of Association
A state may regulate expression more extensively when it does so for
reasons independent of its content. The Constitution, for example,
grants the states broad power to regulate the time, place, and manner of
holding elections.95 This power does not, however, allow states to
abridge fundamental rights such as the right of association.96 The right
of association may be implicated in slate mailer regulation since the most
recent requirements mandate disclosure of party affiliation where one
party's candidate is included in a mailer apparently representing another
party.
97
89. Id. at 894.
90. Id. at 894-95.
91. Id. at 895.
92. 248 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Ct. App. 1988).
93. Id. at 257-60.
94. Mann, 278 Cal. Rptr. 887.
95. Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986).
96. Id.
97. See supra part I.C.
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In Tashjian v. Republican Party,98 the Supreme Court held unconsti-
tutional a Connecticut statute requiring party membership of voters par-
ticipating in a political party's primary election because the statute
infringed on a party's right to freedom of association.99 "It is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of be-
liefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom
of speech," the Court declared. 1" The right of the Republican Party to
include independent voters in its primary outweighed the state's interest
in limiting administrative costs. 10' The Court also rejected the argument
that a party's open primary promoted voter confusion because voters
could not determine candidates' views unless they were elected solely by
party members. "Our cases reflect a greater faith in the ability of individ-
ual voters to inform themselves about campaign issues."' 1 2 The law was
also objectionable because it restricted the flow of information, depriving
a party and its members of the views of an important segment of the
voting population.1
0 3
Unlike the restrictions in the Connecticut statute, slate mailer dis-
closure requirements increase rather than diminish the flow of political
information. In addition, slate mailer disclosure requirements do not
prohibit inclusion of non-member candidates in "party" mailers. Regula-
tions requiring disclosure of party affiliation may, however, inhibit a
speaker's chance to be included in a particular mailer, because slate
mailer organizations may be reluctant to "endorse" candidates identified
as "another" party's members. Consequently, such regulation may be
deemed to infringe upon a candidate's right of association.
3. Mandated Disclosures
Slate mailer regulation involves compelled disclosure, and disclosure
can, in itself, seriously infringe on First Amendment association rights.
Required disclosure of contributors to political campaigns, for example,
can subject those individuals to possible harm."°4 In Brown v. Socialist
Workers,"°5 the Supreme Court held that an Ohio law requiring disclo-
sure of the names and addresses of campaign contributors and recipients
of campaign disbursements could not be applied to the Socialist Workers
98. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
99. Id. at 214.
100. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
101. Id. at 218.
102. Id. at 220.
103. Id. at 221.
104. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1975).
105. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
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Party. Disclosure would make both contributors and recipients vulnera-
ble to threats, harassment, and reprisals."°' Moreover, by "crippl[ing] a
minor party's ability to operate effectively," disclosure would reduce the
free flow of ideas in the political arena.1 "7
Courts have upheld disclosure requirements where the threat of har-
assment does not exist and important state interests are involved. State
interests must survive "exacting scrutiny," however, and there must be a
"relevant correlation" or "substantial relation" between the state's inter-
est and the information that is required to be disclosed. 108
For example, the Court has endorsed regulations requiring strict
disclosures of the sources of financial support.1 °9 The Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971110 requires political committees to keep detailed
records of contributions and expenditures and to make quarterly reports.
As amended in 1974, the Act required candidates to divulge the name
and address of anyone who contributed more than ten dollars and the
occupation and principal place of business of anyone who contributed
$100 or more in one year.' The Court upheld the provisions because
they advanced compelling interests and met the "substantial relation"
test. Disclosure, the Court noted, enables voters to evaluate candidates
based upon their supporters, inhibits corruption by exposing large contri-
bution sources, and enables detection of contributions violating statutory
limits. 112
Most states require author identification of campaign literature.' 1 3
These disclosure laws may inhibit individuals from disseminating their
views. 1 4 The public interests the laws serve, however, likely outweigh
the risk of chilled expression. Such measures are supportable because
they deter defamation and permit more accurate voter assessment of
campaign literature.1 5 Carefully drawn laws requiring campaign litera-
ture disclosure should be constitutionally permissible." 6
The Court has invalidated disclosure requirements which sweep too
broadly, however. A blanket prohibition on dissemination of anonymous
106. Id. at 97.
107. Id. at 98.
108. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
109. See id. at 60-61.
110. 2 U.S.C. § 431-456 (1988).
111. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 63. In 1976, Congress amended 2 U.S.C. § 432(c)(2) to require
that political committees divulge only the name and address of anyone who contributes in
excess of fifty dollars.
112. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68.
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campaign literature, for example, is unconstitutional. A Los Angeles or-
dinance prohibiting distribution of any handbills in any place under any
circumstances which did not identify the name and address of the author
and distributor was invalid "on its face."' 7 The Court noted that perse-
cuted groups throughout history have had to resort to anonymous litera-
ture to be heard. I I While the state claimed the purpose of the ordinance
was to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising, or libel, the
ordinance, in fact, barred all handbills, truthful as well as defamatory.' 9
Similarly, in Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court,2° a Cali-
fornia court of appeal held unconstitutional an Elections Code section
prohibiting all anonymous political campaign literature other than mere
support statements. Although the state has an interest in assisting the
electorate's rational decision-making, the interest does not justify a blan-
ket prohibition of all anonymous campaign literature.' 2 ' "[S]uch state
interests can be furthered through more narrowly constructed statutes
without the criminalization of anonymously uttering the truth."'
' 22
C. Remedies for False or Misleading Speech
1. More Speech
Political speech is often not "truthful." Nevertheless, there are few
remedies available to those injured by false or misleading political
speech. "More speech, not enforced silence," is the constitutionally pre-
ferred remedy.' 23 "We depend for ... correction," the Court has noted,
"not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of
other ideas."' 24 The First Amendment "embodies our trust in the free
exchange of ideas as the means by which the people are to choose be-
tween good ideas and bad, and between candidates for political office."'
1 25
Arguably, problems associated with misleading slate mailers are best
solved by candidate complaints and media disclosure. Because many
mailers arrive shortly before an election, however, such disclosure can
come too late.
117. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1959).
118. Id. at 64.
119. Id.
120. 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. California v. Schuster, 450
U.S. 1042 (1981).
121. Id. at 452.
122. Id.
123. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1981) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
124. Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 61 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974)).
125. Id. at 60.
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2 Tort Actions
The Court has greatly limited damages a political candidate can re-
cover for false or misleading speech related to official conduct.
"[E]rroneous statement," the Court has declared, "is inevitable in free
debate." '26 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"2 7 the defendant newspa-
per published an advertisement which included some false statements
about police action against civil rights demonstrators.' 28 The Court held
that a state could not constitutionally award damages for a defamatory
statement about a public person's official conduct unless the statement
was made with "actual malice," i.e., with knowledge that the statement is
false or with reckless disregard for the truth.'29 Absent "actual malice,"
it is thus unlikely that an individual could maintain a defamation action
against a slate mailer organization.
3. Antitrust Legislation
Antitrust legislation apparently does not provide a remedy for false
or misleading political speech either. In Eastern Railroad Conference v.
Noerr Motors,130 the Court held that a deliberately deceptive campaign
by a group of railroads to influence legislation was political activity not
prohibited by the Sherman Act's prohibitions against monopolies or re-
straints on trade. In Noerr, the railroads had hired a public relations
firm, which circulated propaganda having the appearance of being the
spontaneous declarations of independent groups. 131
Following Noerr, the Ninth Circuit held in Rodgers v. Federal Trade
Commission132 that the Federal Trade Commission Act 133 was not appli-
cable to campaign activities. In affirming the dismissal of a case against
opponents of an "anti-litter" campaign in Washington, the court rejected
the argument that opponents had engaged in "unfair and deceptive prac-
tices in commerce."' 134 The court declined to apply commercial speech
analysis to the conduct because its purpose was primarily political, e.g.,
to influence the electorate at large.' 35 The willful use of distortion or
deception was irrelevant.'
36
126. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
127. Id. at 254.
128. Id. at 256-58.
129. Id. at 279-80.
130. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
131. Id. at 140.
132. 492 F.2d 228 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
134. Rodgers, 492 F.2d at 229-30.
135. Id. at 229-31.
136. Id.
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In O'Connor v. Superior Court, 1 37 a case involving a slate mailer, a
court of appeal in California ruled that California's consumer protection
statutes do not apply to political speech. 138 Although he won the elec-
tion, incumbent Phillip Wyman sued B.A.D. over its circulation of a
slate mailer endorsing his opponent Lucinda O'Connor for the 34th dis-
trict state Assembly seat.139 The mailer had been fast and loose with its
quotes. State Senator Walter Stiern was quoted as saying, "Wyman
wants to use [Kern County] for L.A.'s garbage dump," when Stiern had
neither made the statement nor given permission for it to be attributed to
him."4 Also without permission for the statement's use, the mailer
falsely claimed that Joe Martin, state commander of the Veterans of For-
eign Wars, had described Wyman as "no friend of veterans."141
Wyman argued that California's Business and Professions Code
should apply to campaign literature.'42 Section 17500 of the Code de-
clares it unlawful "for any.., firm, corporation or association.., to...
disseminate.., in any newspaper or other publication.., any statement,
concerning such ... services ... which is untrue or misleading."' 43 Not-
ing that federal cases involving the Federal Trade Commission Act and
the Sherman Antitrust Act have held that laws regulating business prac-
tices do not apply to political activity,' 44 the court concluded that Cali-
fornia's statute does not apply to political speech. 45 The court argued
that the broad language of the provisions provided no standards for regu-
lating First Amendment conduct and that the California legislature
could have included political activity within the purview of the code if
this had been its intention.
146
After the O'Connor decision, the California legislature passed regu-
lations requiring a Notice to Voters on the face of slate mailers. 47 Since
all regulations on slate mailers are contained in Title 9 of the California
Government Code,' 41 it appears the legislature intends the Fair Political
Practices Commission to enforce complaints which fall short of private
tort actions.
137. 223 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App.), review denied, June 20, 1986.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 358.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 359.
143. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 1987).
144. O'Connor, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
145. Id. at 361.
146. Id.
147. See supra part I.




The Case for Slate Mailer Regulation
A. Deceptive Practices of Slate Mailers
Despite the required disclosures and penalties for violations in Title
9, slate mailers remain misleading. The effectiveness of some mailers'
"endorsements" of candidates and causes appears to lie principally in the
mailers' ability to deceive. Only a careful reader will notice the eight-
point Notice to Voters stating that the mailer is not official and that some
candidates and supporters of ballot measures have paid for endorsement.
The asterisk, required after the names of those who have paid to appear
on a mailer, is especially easy to overlook because it is tiny and appears at
the end of the last sentence of the notice.149 Deception is inevitable un-
less voters are aware that mailers are not official documents, that many
candidates and ballot measure proponents have paid to be endorsed, and
that appearance on the mailers does not constitute endorsement of other
persons or issues listed.
Some slate mailers masquerade as official documents and misrepre-
sent the views of candidates. Sometimes, mailers appear to carry official
major party endorsements for members of the other major party who
have paid to be included.150 Some recent examples include the following:
For $5,000, Tom Campbell, Republican candidate for the 12th Congres-
sional district, was endorsed on the 1988 "Democratic Voting Guide"
which also recommended votes for Democratic presidential candidate
Michael Dukakis and Democratic U.S. Senate nominee Leo McCar-
thy.' "Your Republican Voting Guide" (Nov. 1990) endorsed Demo-
crats Norman Waters for the state Assembly and Patti Garamendi for
the state Senate. The mailer appeared official-the front side carried
Ronald Reagan's picture and the name and polling place of the voter to
whom it was addressed. 152 Another "Republican" mailer, "The Republi-
can Vote by Mail Project," endorsed Democrat Arlo Smith for Attorney
General in 1990.153 A "Victory 88" mailer urged a vote for the "Repub-
lican Team" but endorsed a number of Democrats and took positions on
some ballot measures which were contrary to the official Republican po-
sition.154 The pseudo-official mailers deceive less-aware voters by encour-
aging belief that "their" party endorses a candidate or issue it does not.
149. Id. § 84305.5(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992); see also supra part I.
150. Legislation made effective Jan. 1, 1992 may deter this practice. See supra part I.B.
151. Simon, supra note 2, at 289.
152. CITIZENS FOR REPUBLICAN VALUES, YOUR REPUBLICAN VOTING GUIDE, Calaveras
Cty., Nov. 1990.
153. Murphy & Feldman, supra note 2.
154. Reich, supra note 13.
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The 1992 mandate requiring party designations for endorsed candi-
dates who are not members of the party apparently represented by the
mailer should discourage the practice of supporting opposition candi-
dates. The new regulation, however, does not cover situations where
the opposition party has paid the slate mailer organization to make "no
endorsement" in an important race.156 Candidates sometimes purchase
spots on slates to keep the opposition off them. Supporters for Demo-
cratic candidate Arlo Smith paid "Your Republican Voter Guide" to
withhold endorsement from his Republican opponent Dan Lungren. 1' 7
A headline on the guide declared the Republican "is not qualified to be
Attorney General."'58 The California Republican Party filed an official
complaint with the Fair Political Practices Commission'59 but did not
pursue it after Lungren won the election. Although it is impossible to
know how many Republican voters were persuaded by the mailers that
Smith, not Lungren, represented their party, the mailer sought to give
them that impression.
Slate mailers sometimes imply that party luminaries have endorsed
a measure they have opposed or that they oppose a measure they in fact
endorse. In 1986, B.A.D., which is associated with Democratic causes,
mailed a "Republican Team '86 Ticket" to registered Republicans urging
them to vote for Republican incumbent George Deukmejian for gover-
nor. The same mailer also urged a "no" vote on Proposition 51, the
"deep pockets initiative," a measure Deukmejian and the Republican
Party had endorsed."W In 1988, "The Community Democrat" carried a
banner headline stating that Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley recom-
mended a "no" vote on Proposition 103 when he had, in fact, endorsed
the proposition. 6 ' Although Deukmejian opposed all five insurance
measures, "Governor Deukmejian's Official Ballot Recommendations,"
mailed by the insurance industry which supported measures 101, 104,
and 106, urged a "no" vote only on Propositions 100 and 103.162 Pro-
choice candidates in 1992 primary races who failed to pay the "Pro-
155. It may not. It is certainly conceivable that some voters may be persuaded that their
party has actually renounced its own nominee. For example, many prominent Republicans
denounced the candidacy of Louisiana's Republican gubernatorial candidate David Duke in
1990.
156. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 84305.5(a)(5) (West Supp. 1992).
157. Murphy & Feldman, supra note 2.
158. CITIZENS FOR REPUBLICAN VALUES, YOUR REPUBLICAN VOTING GUIDE, Nov.
1990.
159. Murphy & Feldman, supra note 2.
160. UPI, supra note 5.
161. PR Newswire, supra note 5. "The Community Democrat" was produced by Willard
Murray, a 54th Assembly District candidate. Id.
162. Reich, supra note 13.
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Choice Voter Guide" for endorsement risked having the mailer endorse
an opponent who did pay. 163 Voters were thus left with the impression
that unendorsed candidates were not pro-choice. The uninformed voter
is purposely misled by such practices. '"
Slate mailers are arguably no more deceptive than the campaign
literature and stump speeches of individual candidates. '65 Political hy-
perbole and even false allegations are known features of individual cam-
paigns. Literature supporting an individual candidate, however, does not
purport to be an official party slate. Moreover, organizations responsible
for individual campaign publications are much more readily identifiable
than those responsible for private slate mailers. Deceptive slate mailers,
therefore, pose greater problems than deceptive speech by individual
candidates.
B. Recommended Strengthening of Current Regulations
1. More Prominent Disclosures
Disclosure of information is probably the most effective means of
constitutionally combatting deceptive slate mailers. Disclosure promotes
an informed electorate, an important governmental interest, 166 without
unnecessarily impinging on free speech. To be effective, however,
mandatory disclosures on slate mailers must be prominent enough to be
noticed, and penalties for infractions need to be sufficiently strong to de-
ter noncompliance. The requisite notice would be far more legible in ten-
point type rather than the currently mandated eight-point. The larger
type should not unduly interfere with the mailer itself.1 67 Adding a four-
teen-point asterisk at the beginning of the Notice to Voters would also be
helpful. A large, prominently positioned asterisk would assist voters in
understanding the significance of asterisks placed next to the names of
candidates and ballot measures. Such modifications would help voters
recognize that mailers are not official party documents, that appearance
in a mailer does not necessarily imply endorsement of other candidates or
issues in the mailer, and that some candidates and ballot measure propo-
nents have paid to be endorsed.
163. Murphy, supra note 14.
164. The amendment to CAL. Gov'T CODE § 84305.5 that goes into effect Jan. 1, 1993-
requiring mailers to include a disclosure that appearance in the mailer does not imply endorse-
ment of, or opposition to, issues set forth in the mailer-should help voters recognize that
endorsed candidates may or may not agree with the position the mailer has taken on statewide
ballot measures. Cal. A.B. 1640, supra note 42.
165. This is the position taken by Carl D'Agostino of B.A.D. See Simon, supra note 2, at
291.
166. See Buckley v. Vafleo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1975).
167. The text of mailers is invariably in type larger than 10-point.
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2. Greater Penalties for Infractions
Although the legislature strengthened slate mailer regulation in
1991,161 the current penalties still insufficiently deter organizations that
ignore particular code provisions. For example, a slate mailer organiza-
tion that neglects to place the requisite Notice to Voters on its mailer
would apparently be subject to a maximum fine of $2,000 if it fulfilled
other requirements imposed by the Political Reform Act. 169 For busi-
nesses receiving many times that amount from candidates and ballot
measures, $2000 is a relatively small price for deception. Furthermore,
once an election is over, misled voters and successful candidates have
little incentive to pursue violations. Larger fines for failure to comply
with disclosure regulations should help deter the potential violator.
C. The Challenge to Regulation: Slate Mailers as Political Speech
As a legislature can constitutionally ban misleading commercial
speech, 70 the permissibility of regulating slate mailers would not be an
issue if the mailers were commercial advertisements. As Lawrence Tribe
has observed, the line between political speech and commercial speech is
not definitive. 7 Justice Stevens has noted that it is not entirely clear if
the defining feature is the content of the speech or the motivation of the
speaker.
172
On the one hand, "advertising which 'links a product to a current
debate' is not thereby entitled to the Constitutional protection afforded
noncommercial speech."' 73 Mailed advertisements for contraceptives at
issue in Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp. 171 contained a discussion of
important public issues. Nevertheless, because the mailings were adver-
tisements, made reference to a specific product, and were economically
motivated, the Supreme Court concurred with the district court that the
mailings were commercial, not political speech.
75
On the other hand, the Court has characterized businesses' direct
remarks on public policy issues as political, not commercial speech.'
76
Government-regulated monopolies that comment directly on public is-
168. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
169. This would apparently constitute only one violation. See supra notes 43-44 and ac-
companying text.
170. See supra part II.B.
171. TRIBE, supra note 113, at 894-95.
172. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 579 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 563 n.5.
174. 463 U.S. 60 (1982).
175. Id. at 67-68.
176. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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sues enjoy First Amendment protections. 77 Protected speech does not
lose its status simply because a corporation is the speaker.1 78 In First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 179 the Court held that a film distribu-
tion company operating for profit was in the same position as for-profit
publishers of books, magazines, and newspapers. As the Court has writ-
ten, companies do not forfeit their First Amendment rights because of
their profit motivations.18
The fact that speech is in the form of an advertisement is not deter-
minative either. The speech at issue in New York Times was a paid ad-
vertisement, but this was completely irrelevant to its classification as
protected speech. A different conclusion, the Court noted, would dis-
courage newspapers from carrying such advertisements and shut off an
important outlet for those who do not otherwise have access to the me-
dia. "[I]f the allegedly libelous statements would otherwise be constitu-
tionally protected ... they do not forfeit that protection because they
were published in the form of a paid advertisement."
' 18 1
The fact that slate mailer organizations are businesses is, therefore,
almost certainly irrelevant to the issue of their regulation. Presumably,
slate mailers would be characterized as political rather than commercial
speech. Slate mailers do not propose commercial transactions. Any pro-
motion of slate mailer organizations themselves is indirect; the slates di-
rectly promote only candidates and ballot measures in political
campaigns. Because they are clearly campaign literature, slate mailers
are almost certain to receive the full constitutional protections accorded
political speech.
Nonetheless, the more prominent disclosures on slate mailers rec-
ommended by this Note should be constitutionally permissible. The
state has a compelling interest in an informed electorate, the proposed
regulations' impact upon the flow of information is minimal, and the pro-
visions are narrowly drawn to serve the state interest. In addition, cur-
rent regulations and the minor modifications to them suggested in this
Note constitute neither impermissible prior restraint nor infringement
upon the freedom of association. Moreover, disclosure requirements
pose no genuine risk of harassment to slate mailer organizations. Fi-
nally, the preferred constitutional remedy of "more speech" is
inadequate.
177. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n. 1 (1980).
178. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765.
179. Id.
180. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
181. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
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D. The Constitutional Permissibility of Regulating Political Speech
1. The State's Interest in an Informed Electorate
The state's interest in an informed electorate is a compelling one.
Clear identification of the sources of campaign literature helps the voter
evaluate a statement's credibility and make a more informed decision at
the polls.1"2 As the Court in Buckley said, "[I]n a republic where the
people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed
choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those
who are elected will inevitably shape the course we follow as a na-
tion."' 83 The state's interest in seeing that voters are not deceived by
misleading mailers should outweigh a candidate's or slate mailer organi-
zation's desire to trick the voting public into thinking the mailer is some-
thing it is not, or into thinking a person supports a candidate or issue
when he does not.
2. The Minimal Infringement on Protected Speech
Current and proposed disclosure regulations involve a minimal reg-
ulation of ideas. Mandating that slate mailer organizations disclose cer-
tain information does not constitute state "select[ion of] which issues are
worth discussing or debating."I 4 While the 1992 mandate of party affili-
ation disclosure for candidates whose party differs from the one the
mailer appears to represent may deter messages from opposition candi-
dates, the regulation does not prevent them. Requiring organizations to
divulge their identity and sources of support does not affect the issues the
speaker may address nor the point of view the candidate may adopt.
Current and proposed disclosure requirements do not prohibit candidates
and ballot measure proponents from making whatever appeals they wish
to make to voters. The Hartlage Court invalidated regulations on polit-
ical speech because the state attempted to limit the content of a candi-
date's speech."8 ' Disclosure requirements, far from depriving anyone of
information, increase what the voter knows about candidates and ballot
measures.
3. The Close Nexus Between the Regulations and the Objective
Mandating legible notices to voters and requiring disclaimers that
appearance in the mailer does not imply endorsement of or opposition to
182. See Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447, 451 (Ct. App.
1980), cert. denied sub nom. California v. Schuster, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981).
183. 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
184. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982) (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mos-
ley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
185. Id. at 60. See supra part II.
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any other candidate or issue set forth in the mailer directly promotes the
end sought-helping ensure that deceptive tactics do not mislead voters.
Such requirements are narrowly drawn; they apply only to slate mailers
mailed by slate mailer organizations, not to all campaign literature. By
requiring slate mailer organizations to notify voters that some candidates
and ballot measure proponents have paid for endorsements and to clarify
that the mailers are not official party documents, and that appearance in
the mailer does not necessarily imply endorsement of other candidates or
issues listed, the regulations are narrowly tailored to meet the specific
problem that mailers are not what they appear to be.
4. The Absence of Concerns Associated with Prior Restraints and Intrusions
on Freedom of Association
California legislators have proposed a number of reforms for slate
mailers, many of which would not likely survive constitutional scrutiny.
An outright ban on the publication of slate mailers, for example, would
almost certainly be unconstitutional because slate mailers are protected
speech. I8 6 It is also likely that the courts would view as an impermissible
prior restraint a statute that required written authorization from candi-
dates before their names or pictures were used on a slate mailer"8 7 or one
that required a political party's permission before a slate mailer organiza-
tion could distribute mailers appearing to be official party endorse-
ments. 188  An organization is as free to endorse a candidate as an
individual is. I 9 Moreover, it is difficult to justify why a party or candi-
date should serve as censor when the state must not.
Further disclosure requirements, on the other hand, should not con-
stitute impermissible prior restraints because many of the concerns re-
garding prior restraints are not present. The Fair Political Practices
Commission can issue cease and desist orders only after publication and
circulation, not before. No censor views and rules on the permissibility
of the materials before publication. 1" The Commission must determine
there is probable cause a violation has occurred and exacts penalties only
after a noticed hearing.19' Because most mailers arrive late in a cam-
186. See supra part II.
187. This was proposed by Cal. A.B. 1027, 1989-91 Reg. Sess. (1989).
188. This was proposed in Cal. A.B. 1047, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1991). Assemblyman Byron
Sher argues that slate mailers should be considered commercial speech, and as such, candi-
dates' names might be protected as trademarks are. See Mark Simon, Sher's Bill to Toughen
Slate Mailing Laws Gets Even Tougher in Committee Meeting, PENINSULA TIMEs TRIB., May
19, 1989, at A9.
189. See Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 283 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2331
(1991).
190. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
191. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 83116 (West Supp. 1992).
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paign, it is likely the election would precede any cease and desist order.
Moreover, although current and proposed regulations mandate certain
disclosures, they do not restrict what the speaker can say. The Commis-
sion cannot issue a cease and desist order because a slate mailer includes
a false or misleading statement.' 92 The requirements permit voter aware-
ness of the source of the speech and the nature of the endorsements; they
do not prohibit the mailers from presenting their message.
Nor should the regulations pose an impermissible barrier to freedom
of association. Mandated disclosures will interfere with one's right of
association only to the extent that a slate mailer organization is deterred
from endorsing candidates from different parties on the same slate. An
organization publishing a single party slate may hesitate to promote can-
didates labeled as members of the opposition party. Significantly, the
regulations do not prohibit a slate mailer organization from endorsing
any candidate or issue it chooses.
Further, there seems little danger that clearer disclosure of the
source of the literature and the names of candidates and ballot measure
supporters who paid for endorsement would subject anyone to harass-
ment. Slate mailer organizations, candidates for political office, and bal-
lot measure sponsors are "main stream" groups, distinguishable from
"fringe" groups subject to historical harassment such as the Socialist
Workers Party.' 93 Admittedly, required disclosure of the sources of
speech is distinguishable from required disclosure of the sources of polit-
ical contributions. The political contributor does not "stand in the same
shoes" as a pamphleteer, and leaflets and pamphlets have been "historic
weapons in the defense of liberty."1 94 Businesses that endorse major
party candidates for a price as much as a conviction, however, are distin-
guishable from street-corner pamphleteers who voice unpopular views.
5. The Inadequate Remedy of "More Speech"
While the preferred remedy to false or misleading speech is more
speech, 9 1 the remedy is inadequate in the case of slate mailers. Candi-
date outcries and press coverage of violations can do much to alert the
voter, but media coverage of slate mailer violations is sparse in the
smaller papers, and press commentary on lesser known candidates is lim-
ited. Slate mailers generally arrive at the close of the campaign, too late
for exposure of violations to have an impact on a political race. In these
192. Cf Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116 (Cal. 1975).
193. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 100-102 (1982).
194. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 62 (1960) (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 452 (1938)).
195. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1981) (citations omitted). See supra part II.D.1.
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instances, the remedy of "more speech" is inadequate. It is worth noting
that Justice Brandeis' often quoted statement that "the remedy to be ap-
plied is more speech" was qualified by the words "[i]f there be time."
1 96
Additionally, while the Court may have envisioned "more speech" as
coming from sources other than the offending one, disclosures are a form
of more speech. Certainly, they do not constitute "enforced silence."
IV
Conclusion
Freedom of speech is one of our most cherished values, and the First
Amendment gives its greatest protection to political speech. Govern-
ment regulation of political speech is permissible, however, if the state
interest is sufficiently compelling and the regulation is narrowly drawn to
serve that interest.
Regulating slate mailers is justified because the state has a legitimate
interest in an informed electorate. Requirements that slate mailer orga-
nizations clearly inform the voter that mailers are not official documents,
that some candidates and ballot measure proponents have paid to be en-
dorsed, and that appearance in the mailer does not imply endorsement of
other candidates or issues in the mailer are all narrowly drawn, reason-
able methods for avoiding voter deception. Imposition of fines large
enough to deter organizations from ignoring the requirements is also rea-
sonable. Requiring adequate disclosure on slate mailers serves the public
interest while preserving the right of candidates, ballot measure propo-
nents, and slate mailer organizations to get their message to the voter.
With relatively minor changes in current regulations, California's slate
mailer provisions can serve as a model for other states.
196. "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis
added), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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